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Queueing networks are typically modelled assuming that the arrival process is exogenous, and unaffected by
admission control, scheduling policies, etc. In many situations, however, users choose the time of their arrival
strategically, taking delay and other metrics into account. In this paper, we develop a framework to study
such strategic arrivals into queueing networks. We start by deriving a functional strong law of large numbers
(FSLLN) approximation to the queueing network. In the fluid limit derived, we then study the population
game wherein users strategically choose when to arrive, and upon arrival which of the K queues to join.
The queues start service at given times, which can potentially be different. We characterize the (strategic)
arrival process at each of the queues, and the price of anarchy of the ensuing strategic arrival game. We
then extend the analysis to multiple populations of users, each with a different cost metric. The equilibrium
arrival profile and price of anarchy are derived. Finally, we present the methodology for exact equilibrium
analysis. This, however, is tractable for only some simple cases such as two users arriving at a two node
queueing network, which we then present.
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1. Introduction
This paper is motivated by the following scenario: Users arriving at a concert, a game or at a store
for Black Friday sales, where arriving before others is preferable, are faced with the dilemma of
when to arrive. Should one arrive early before others and wait a while for service to start, or arrive
late and wait less, and yet by which time the best seats or deals may already be gone? In such
settings, when rational users make strategic decisions of timing, we cannot assume that the arrival
process can be modelled by an exogenous renewal process such as a Poisson process. Furthermore,
there may be multiple queues (which may start service at different times) and arriving users may
have a choice of which queue to join.
Similarly, users downloading large files from a website often time their downloads to times of
day when network congestion is expected to be lower (e.g., late at night.) Moreover, upon arrival
(at the web-site), they may have to choose which server to download from. A natural question to
ask is “Does an equilibrium arrival process exist”? If it does, is it efficient with respect to some
metric? If not, can we bound the amount of inefficiency? We answer these questions by modeling
this strategic arrival behavior as a game that we call the network concert queueing game. Such
strategic analysis of queues was introduced in Juneja and Jain (2009), Jain et al. (2011) for a single
server FIFO queue. In this paper, we extend that analysis to a network of queues.
In this paper, users choose their arrival time into a parallel queueing network wherein queues
serve at different rates, and start service at different times. We assume servers are work-conserving
with infinite buffers. Users can start to queue even before service starts, and do not renege or
balk. We also consider that users may belong to multiple populations, each with different cost
characteristics. The game is analyzed in the fluid approximation setting which offers significant
analytical simplicity and tractability, while still capturing essential features of the problem. Each
arriving user chooses a queue to join, and a time to arrive that minimizes a linear cost that is
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a weighted function of the waiting time and the service completion time. The service completion
time of a user depends on the arrival time, and may be considered as a proxy for the latter metric.
We make two main contributions in this paper. Our first contribution is a fluid limit for the
queueing model we introduce, wherein each user picks his time of arrival from a distribution. Thus,
the inter-arrival times are not independent, and the arrival process need not be a renewal process
in general. Functional strong law of large numbers approximation to the queue length process, the
busy time and the virtual waiting time process at each queue is derived. Also of interest would be
a diffusion limit (via the functional central limit theorem) for the various processes of interest in
this non-standard queueing model. We have made some progress on this, and is on-going work.
Our second contribution is to take the fluid approximation derived above, and study the associ-
ated population game wherein each non-atomic user strategically picks a time of arrival, as well as
a queue it would join. Existence of equilibria in such non-atomic games was established in Schmei-
dler (1973). We, however, argue its existence (and uniqueness) by construction. The equilibrium
arrival profile turns out to be a uniform distribution over a time interval that we can determine.
We also characterize the loss in social welfare due to strategically arriving users, and obtain an
exact expression for the price of anarchy of the game.
While there has been a lot of work on studying pricing of queueing service (see Dube and Jain
(2011), Hassin and Haviv (2003), Mendelson and Whang (1990), Naor (1969)), games of timing
where the users choose an arrival time strategically are not so well-understood. The earliest such
work is Glazer and Hassin (1983) in which a discrete population of users choose the time of their
arrival strategically into an ?/M/1 queue, by minimizing the queueing delay. Problems with similar
motivation have been considered in the transportation literature but they have focused on non-
queueing theoretic fluid models with delay alone as a cost metric (Lindsey 2004). In contrast, the
framework of Jain et al. (2011) is more general: Each user has a cost which is a function of the
waiting time as well as the service completion time of the user (a proxy for the number of users
who arrive before that user) - a significant motivation for users to arrive early in many scenarios.
On the other hand, only a fluid approximation of the discrete population model is considered.
In Section 2, we first develop a path-wise description of the parameters describing the queueing
network, and fluid limit approximations to these processes. Next, we analyze the strategic arrivals
game in the fluid setting, for a single arriving population in Section 3, and derive the equilibrium
arrival distribution and the price of anarchy of this game. In Section 4, we derive the equilibrium
arrival profile for multiple populations with disparate arrival costs, and show that it is unique. We
derive the price of anarchy of this game, show that in a special case, it is bounded above by 2.
In Section 5, we illustrate the difficulty in doing exact equilibrium analysis for a finite population,
and hence the importance of equilibrium analysis in the fluid limit. We conclude with a summary
and discussion of further work in Section 6.
2. The Queueing Network: Model and Fluid Limit
Consider a queueing network with K single server FIFO nodes in parallel. Each node starts service
at some fixed time (which could be different from the other nodes), offers service with a finite
service rate, and operates independently of the other nodes. Each users’ time of arrival is an
i.i.d. random variable with a given distribution and known support such that users can arrive and
queue up even before service starts. Note that inter-arrival times need not be independent. Service
times are i.i.d., and independent of the arrival process. A user upon arrival joins one of the queues
according to a given routing probability. Routing will be assumed independent of the arrival time
process. We first develop the fluid limits for the queueing model introduced as the population size
increases to ∞.
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space, and DK :=DK [−T0,∞) the space of K-dimensional “right-
continuous with left limits”, or cadlag processes (see Durrett (2010), Billingsley (1968)). Suppose
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there are n users arriving at the queueing network. Let ξi : Ω→{1, · · · ,K} be a random variable
such that user i is routed to the ξi(ω)th node in the network. Thus, p0,k = P (ξi = k).
Let Ti : Ω→ [−T0, T ] be the arrival time of user i, and F the arrival time distribution. Denote
An(t) := (An1 (t), · · · ,AnK(t))∈DK , where AnK(t) counts the number of arrivals at queue k, i.e.,
Ank(t) :=
n∑
i=1
1{Ti≤t}1{ξi=k}, ∀t∈ [−T0, T ], (1)
where 1{·} denotes the indicator function. Let An(t) =
∑K
i=1A
n
i (t) be the aggregate number of
arrivals to the network by t.
Let νki : Ω→ (0,∞) be the service time of arrival i to queue k in the network, independent of Ti
and ξi. Let mk be the mean service time, µk = 1/mk the service rate and Ts,k ≥ 0 the service start
time of queue k. We accelerate the service rate by scaling the service time by n, i.e., ν¯ki =
νki
n
is the
accelerated service time of user i at queue k. The accelerated or scaled service process of queue k
is defined as
Snk (t) := sup
{
m∈N |
m∑
i=1
ν¯ki ≤ t−Ts,k
}
, ∀t≥ Ts,k. (2)
The service vector process is Sn(t) := (Sn1 (t), · · · , SnK(t))
′ ∈DK .
Let Vk(m) =
∑m
i=1 ν
k
i be the service time requirement for m users at queue k. We will call it the
(cumulative) workload process, and its scaled process description is
V nk (t) :=
bntc∑
i=1
ν¯ki , ∀t∈ [−T0, T ]. (3)
The vector cumulative workload process is Vn(t) := (V n1 (t), · · · , V nK(t))
′
. It is easy to see that V nk (t)
and Snk (t) are renewal “inverses” of each other.
We now develop path-wise functional strong law of large numbers approximations to these
processes as n→∞. We will assume that ξi, Ti and νki are mutually independent. Denote M =
diag(m1, · · · ,mK), p= (p0,1, · · · , p0,K)′ , and ts,+(t) := ((t− Ts,1)+, · · · , (t− Ts,K)+)′ where (x)+ :=
x1{x≥0}. The fluid limits for the arrival, service and the workload processes are then given by:
Theorem 1. As n → ∞, ( 1
n
An(t), 1
n
Sn(t),Vn(t+T0)
) → (pF (t),M−1ts,+(t),M1(t+T0)) a.s.
u.o.c., ∀t∈ [−T0,∞), where 1= (1, · · · ,1)′.
Here, and in the ensuing, u.o.c. denotes “converges uniformly on compact sets”. The proof of
this theorem is omitted, as it uses standard arguments: Convergence of the service and workload
processes are standard, and follow from the functional strong law of large numbers. The conver-
gence of the arrival process follows from a generalization of the Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem, using
independence of the routing and arrival time random variables.
Now, let Q(t) := (Q1(t), · · · ,QK(t))′ ∈DK , where Qk(t) is the queue length at node k at time t.
We assume that the queueing network starts empty, so Q(−T0) = 0. The queue length process of
node k is given by Qk(t) = (Ak(t)−Sk(t))+, the non-negative difference between the aggregate num-
ber of arrivals and the (potential) service process up to time t. Let the amount of time in [Ts,k, t] that
node k spends serving users be called the busy time process, Bk(t) =
(∫ t
Ts,k
1{Qk(s)>0}ds
)
1{t≥Ts,k}.
It is easy to see that Sk(Bk(t)) is the number of arrivals served by time t. Let the scaled queue
length vector process be given by Qnk(t)/n := (A
n
k(t)/n− Snk (Bnk (t)))+/n. We can rewrite this in
vector form as 1
n
Qn(t) =
(
1
n
An(t)−pF (t))− ( 1
n
Sn(Bn(t))−M−1Bn(t))+ (pF (t)−M−1ts,+(t)) +
M−1
(
In(t)− I˜n(t)
)
+ M−1I˜n(t), where Bn(t) := (Bn1 (t), · · · ,BnK(t))
′
is the busy time process
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vector, In(t) := (In1 (t), · · · , InK(t))
′
= ts,+(t) − Bn(t) is the idle-time process vector, and I˜n(t) :=
(I˜n1 (t), · · · , I˜nK(t))
′
is the cumulative idleness process vector, with I˜nk (t) :=
∫ t
−T0 1{Q
n
k
(s)=0}ds.
This can be rewritten again as 1
n
Qn(t) =Xn(t) +Yn(t), where
Xn(t) :=
(
1
n
An(t)−pF (t)
)
−
(
1
n
Sn(Bn(t))−M−1Bn(t)
)
+ [pF (t)−M−1ts,+(t)]
+M−1[In(t)− I˜n(t)] and (4)
Yn(t) := M−1I˜n(t), (5)
It can be shown that the process Xn(t) satisfies the following functional strong law of large numbers.
Proposition 1. As n→∞, Xn(t)→ X¯(t) := (pF (t)−M−1ts,+(t)), a.s. u.o.c. ∀t∈ [−T0,∞).
The proof is in the appendix. We can now establish the fluid limit for the queue length process.
Theorem 2. (i) The scaled stochastic process vector
(
1
n
Qn(t),Yn(t)
)
satisfies the Oblique
Reflection Mapping Theorem (see Chen and Yao (2001)) and,
(ii) as n → ∞, ( 1
n
Qn(t),Yn(t)
) → (Q¯(t), Y¯(t)) := (Φ(X¯(t)),Ψ(X¯(t))) a.s. u.o.c. ∀t ∈
[−T0,∞), where Φ(X¯(t)) = X¯(t) + Ψ(X¯(t)) and Ψ(X¯)(t) = sup−T0≤s≤t(−X¯(s))+ is the reflection
regulator map.
We now define the virtual waiting time process as W(t) := (W1(t), · · · ,WK(t))′ =Z(t)− ts,−(t),
where ts,−(t) = ((t− Ts,1)1{t≤Ts,1,}, · · · , (t− Ts,K)1{t≤Ts,K})
′
, and the workload process as Z(t) :=
(Z1(t), · · · ,ZK(t))′ where Zk(t) := Vk(Ak(t))−Bk(t), ∀t ∈ [−T0,∞). Here, Vk(Ak(t)) is the total
work presented to queue k by arrivals up to time t. Thus, the workload process is the amount of
work remaining after the queue has been busy for Bk(t) units of time in [Ts,k, t]. Now, the scaled
kth component of W(t) is given by W nk (t) = V
n
k (A
n
k(t))−Bnk (t)− (t− Ts,k)1{t≤Ts,k}. Theorem 3
establishes fluid limits to these processes.
Theorem 3. As n→∞, Bn(t)→ B¯(t) := ts,+(t)−MΨ(X¯(t)) = ts,+(t)−M sup−T0≤s≤t(−X¯(s))+
and Wn(t)→ W¯(t) :=MpF (t)− B¯(t)− ts,−(t) a.s. u.o.c., ∀t∈ [−T0,∞).
The proofs can be found in the Appendix.
3. The Network Concert Queueing Game
We next address the following question: If the arriving users into a parallel queue network choose
a time of arrival so as to minimize a cost function that trades off the amount of time spent waiting
for service against the service completion time (a proxy for the number of users that arrive ahead
of them), what does the arrival process look like? We consider users choosing mixed strategies, i.e.,
probability distributions over arrival times, and look for the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of
the non-atomic game, derived from the fluid limit in the previous section.
Suppose the population size is n. We consider cost functions that are a weighted-linear combi-
nation of the mean waiting time and service completion time. Thus, the expected cost seen by a
user arriving at time t to queue k is Ck(t) = αWk(t) + βt
c
k, where Wk(t) is the expected virtual
waiting time, and the service completion time tck is easily seen to be t
c
k = t+mk +wk(t), with mk
the mean service time. We look for symmetric equilibria in the one-shot arrival game, with each
user having the cost function Ck. In general, it is quite difficult to obtain closed form solutions to
the associated fixed-point problem (we illustrate the methodology in section 5). Thus, we scale the
population size n to ∞, and study the population game associated with the fluid limit derived in
the previous section. Now, the scaled cost function is Cnk (t) = αw
n
k (t) +βt
c,n
k . From Theorem 3, we
then have the limit as Ck(t) = αw¯k(t)+βt¯
c
k, where t¯c,k = t+ w¯k(t) and w¯k(t) =mk(X¯(t)+Ψ(X¯(t))−
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(t − Ts,k)1t≤Ts,k), with X¯(t) = Fk(t) − µk(t − Ts,k)1t≥Ts,k . Here, Fk(t) =
∑M
j=1Fjk(t) denotes the
aggregate arrival profile to queue k.
Now, consider N populations of users, with population j users having cost characteristics (αj, βj).
Denote by Ts,k ≥ 0, the time at which queue k starts service. Let Fjk(t) denote the arrival strategy
of population j at queue k, and F = (F1, · · · ,FK) denotes the (aggregate) arrival profile. Denote
Fj = (Fjl, l = 1, · · · ,K) and F = (Fj, j = 1, · · · ,N) as the strategy profile. The service completion
time for a population j user arriving at time t at queue k is given by tcj,k = t+Wj,k(t), where Wj,k(t)
is the virtual waiting time. Thus, the cost for a population j user arriving at time t at queue k
under arrival distribution F is Cj,k,F(t) = αjWj,k(t) + βj(t+Wj,k(t)). We now define (symmetric)
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium profiles for the non-atomic/population game.
Definition 1. A strategy profile F is an equilibrium strategy profile if for each population j, Fj is
a minimizer of the corresponding cost functions Cjk at each queue k at every time τ in the support
of Fjk (denoted Tjk), i.e., for any arrival profile G, and ∀j, ∀k,
Cjk,F(τ)≤Cjk,G(t) ∀τ ∈ Tj, −∞< t<∞.
In recent literature, these have been called mean field equilibria (Adlakha and Johari 2010).
The equilibrium condition captures the fact that for each population, the equilibrium profile
must minimize its cost into any queue at any time. Furthermore, it also implies that all queues
with a positive flow of population j must have equal cost, i.e., ∀l, k, Cjl,F(t)1{Fjl(∞) > 0} =
Cjk,F(t
′
)1{Fjk(∞)> 0}, for all t and t′ in the support of (the Lebesgue measure corresponding to)
Fjl and Fjk respectively. Though it can be established herein, due to space constraints, we will
just assume that an equilibrium arrival profile does not have any singular continuous components.
Without loss of generality, we also assume that server 1 starts service at Ts,1 = 0 while other servers
have a delayed start with Ts,i > 0, i 6= 1. For simplicity, assume that the queues 1, · · · ,K start in
that order. In the rest of this section, we will consider only a single population of users.
We denote the time of first arrival into queue l by −T0,l, the time of last arrival into any queue
by Tl, and the time the last user served departs from queue l by Tfl. The next two Lemmas help
in finding the equilibrium arrival profile.
Lemma 1. At equilibrium, all queues finish serving users at the same time instant.
Proof: For simplicity, consider only two queues. To see that Tf1 = Tf2, note that at equilibrium, the
costs at each of the queues must be equal at all times. Assume that Tf1 <Tf2. Then a user arriving
into queue 2 at any time t∈ (Tf1, Tf2] must experience a higher cost than if she had simply joined
queue 1 (which is now idle). It follows that this arrival profile cannot be an equilibrium. Similarly,
Tf2 6<Tf1. Thus, we must have Tf1 = Tf2.
The following fact is intuitively obvious but we give a formal argument.
Lemma 2. The parallel queue network is never idle at equilibrium.
Proof: We prove this by contradiction. In light of the fact that the cost of arriving at any of
the queues is the same, it suffices to prove the assertion in the case of a single queue alone.
Let Ts = 0, the service start time. Let F be such that t
∗ := inf{−T0 ≤ s ≤ T |Ψ(X¯(t)) > 0},
i.e., t∗ is the first time that the regulator mapping is positive during the arrival interval,
implying the queue is idle. This implies that Ψ(X¯(t)) = −(F (t∗) − µt∗1{t∗≥0}) > 0. Now,
let  > 0, and t∗ −  is just to the left of t∗. Then, it follows that, C(t∗) = βt∗. Consider,
C(t∗)−C(t∗− ) = βt∗− (α+β)
µ
(Q¯(t∗− ))− β(t∗− ). As t∗ is the first time the queue is empty, it
follows that Q¯(t∗− ) = (F (t∗− )−µ(t∗− )1{t∗−≥0}). Substituting for Q¯ in the expression above,
we have C(t∗)−C(t∗− ) = β()− (α+β)
µ
(F (t∗− )−µ(t∗− )1{t∗−≥0}). Let → 0, and use the fact
that F has no singularities (and hence is continuous), it follows that C(t∗)<C(t∗−). This implies
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that this arrival profile F , cannot be an equilibrium, thus proving the claim.
It follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 that at equilibrium, with a homogeneous population, the last
arrivals into any queue should all happen at the same instant, and this time coincides with the
instant at which the service process catches up with the backlog; that is, Tfl = Tl = T . Using the
above Lemmas, it follows that the cost to a (non-atomic) user arriving at time t as
C(t) = (α+β)(MX¯(t)− ts,−(t)) +βt1=
 (α+β)(p0,1
F (t)
µ1
+Ts,1)−αt
...
(α+β)(p0,K
F (t)
µK
+Ts,K)−αt
 . (6)
3.1. Arrival Distribution
Now, let the arrival profile at queue l at equilibrium be F ∗l (t) with support on [−T0,l, T ], and
define F ∗l (t) := p0,lF
∗(t). Due to space constraints, we note without proof that any equilibrium
arrival profile F is absolutely continuous. We now derive the equilibrium arrival profile illustrated
in Figure 1. Denote γ = α/(α+β).
Theorem 4. Let 0 = Ts,1,≤ Ts,2 ≤ · · · ≤ Ts,K. Assume that Ts,K < 1+
∑K
k=1 µkTs,k∑K
k=1 µk
. Then, the unique
equilibrium arrival profile is F ∗ = (F ∗1 , · · · ,F ∗K), where F ∗l = p0,l(t+T0,l)T+T0,l with support [−T0,l, T ], where
T =
1+
∑K
k=1 µkTs,k∑K
k=1 µk
and −T0,l = (1− 1γ )T +
Ts,l
γ
, and the equilibrium routing probabilities are given by
p∗0,l =
µl∑K
k=1 µk
(1−∑k 6=l µl(Ts,l−Ts,k)).
FK
−T0,1 0 −T0,2 t
F1
p0,1
p0,2
p0,K
F (t)
T−T0,K
...
F2
Figure 1 Equilibrium arrival profile of a single population to a K-queue parallel queueing network.
Proof: Note that the cost function is unbounded as t goes to ±∞. Thus, at equilibrium the arrival
profile must have bounded support. Let the support of the arrival profile to queue l be [−T0,l, T ].
Now, at equilibrium, the cost of arriving at queue l is the same at any time in this arrival interval.
Thus, Cl(T ) =Cl(−T0,l), from which we get
p0,l = γµl(T +T0,l). (7)
Next, the equilibrium expected cost of arrival is the same at any queue and at any time in their
respective arrival intervals. From Lemma 1, we know that the time of last arrival at any queue is
the same for all queues. Thus, Cl(T ) = Ck(T ), for any l, k, and using
∑
l 6=k p0,l = 1− p0,k, we get∑
l 6=k µl(
p0,k
µk
+Ts,k −Ts,l) = 1− p0,k, rearranging which, we get that the equilibrium probability of
routing to queue k upon arrival is p0,k =
µk∑K
l=1 µl
(1−∑l 6=k µk(Ts,k−Ts,l)).
Now, from Lemma 2, we have that µl(T − Ts,k) = p0,k since the population size has
been normalized to 1. Substituting for p0,k, we get T =
1+
∑K
k=1 µkTs,k∑K
k=1 µk
. Now, it follows
6
from equation (7) that −T0,l = T − p0,lγµl . Substituting for T and p0,l we get −T0,l =
1∑K
k=1 µk
(
(1− 1
γ
)(1 +
∑K
k=1 µkTs,k) +
Ts,l
γ
∑K
k=1 µk
)
which simplifies to −T0,l = (1− 1γ )T +
Ts,l
γ
.
Finally, equating the cost of arrival at queue l at any time t with that at T0,l gives (α+β)
F∗l (t)
µl
−
αt= αT0,l, which yields F
∗
l (t) = µlγ(t+T0,l) =
p0,l(t+T0,l)
T+T0,l
, an equilibrium arrival profile at queue l.
We now argue uniqueness. First, note that for a given Ts,l, the terminal service time T is unique.
Let F be another equilibrium profile with support Ti for Fi, where we can take Ti = (−∞, T ]. Now,
the cost of arriving at T is CFi(T ) = βT = CFi(t) for each t ∈ Ti. This is the same as under the
profile F ∗. Thus, Fi(t) = F ∗i (t) on Ti∩ [−T0,i, T ]. Now, since F ∗i (−T0,i) = 0 and F ∗i (T ) = p0,i, F has
total measure 1 at T and is absolutely continuous, it follows that Fi(t) = F
∗
i (t) on [−T0,i, T ].
Remarks. 1. Note that we assume Ts,K <T for convenience. Suppose Ts,l >
1+
∑l−1
k=1
µkTs,k∑l−1
k=1
µk
for some
queue l ∈ {2, · · · ,K}, then at equilibrium no users would arrive at queues {l, . . . ,K}.
3.2. Price of Anarchy
Define the social cost of arrival profile F as J(F ) =
∑K
k=1
∫
CFk(t)dFk(t). Let Jopt denote the
optimal social cost over all arrival profiles, and Jeq(F
∗) the social cost at equilibrium F ∗. It is to be
expected that Jeq(F
∗) will be greater than Jopt. The inefficiency of the equilibrium arrival profile
can be characterized by the price of anarchy (PoA), η= supF∗
Jeq(F
∗)
Jopt
, where the supremum is over
all equilibria. Note that here the equilibrium arrival profile is unique.
Theorem 5. The price of anarchy of the network concert queueing game is given by
η=
2(1 +
∑K
k=1 µkTs,k)(
1 +
∑K
k=1
∑K
l=1 µkµlTs,l(Ts,k−Ts,l) + 2
∑K
k=1 µkTs,k
) .
Proof: Let the equilibrium cost at queue l be Cl(t) = c≡ αT0,1 for all t∈ [−T0,l, T ]. The equilibrium
social cost under profile F ∗ is given by Jeq =
∑K
k=1
∫
CFk(t)dFk(t) = c
∑K
k=1
∫
dFk(t) = c(p0,1 + · · ·+
p0,K) = c. Substituting for c, we have Jeq = αT0,1 = β
1+
∑K
k=1 µkTs,k∑K
k=1 µk
.
Now, the socially optimal outcome would be for each non-atomic user to arrive just at the instant
of service, with zero waiting. In this case, the instantaneous cost would be Copt(t) = βt. Thus, the
optimal arrival profile is given by
dFopt(t) =
l∑
k=1
µkdt, for Ts,l < t≤ Ts,l+1.
It is straightforward to see that the time of last arrival (and service) is Topt = T =
1+
∑K
k=1 µkTs,k∑K
k=1 µk
.
From this, the optimal social cost can be computed as
Jopt =
∫ Ts,2
0
βµ1tdt+
∫ Ts,3
Ts,2
β(µ1 +µ2)tdt+ · · ·+
∫ T
Ts,K
β
( K∑
k=1
µk
)
tdt,
=
β
2
(
T 2
K∑
k=1
µk−
K∑
k=1
µkT
2
s,k
)
=
β
2
∑K
k=1 µk
(
1 +
K∑
k=1
K∑
l=1
µkµlTs,l(Ts,k−Ts,l) + 2
K∑
k=1
µkTs,k
)
.
Using this along with the expression for Jeq derived above, we get the expression for η.
Corollary 1. The price of anarchy η is upper bounded by 2.
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Proof: We will show that Jeq ≤ 2Jopt. Consider the difference Jeq−2Jopt and simplify the expression
to obtain Jeq− 2Jopt = β∑K
k=1 µk
(∑K
k=1 µk
∑K
k=1 µkT
2
s,k−
∑K
k=1 µkTs,k
(∑K
k=1 µkTs,k + 1
))
. Recalling
that T =
1+
∑K
k=1 µkTs,k∑K
k=1 µk
, we can replace the last term on the R.H.S. above and simplify to get Jeq−
2Jopt =
β∑K
k=1 µk
∑K
k=1 µk
(∑K
k=1 µkTs,k(Ts,k−T )
)
. Now, we know from the statement of Theorem 4
that T > Ts,k ∀k. Therefore, it follows that Jeq ≤ 2Jopt.
Remarks. 2. It is easy to see that the upper bound is achieved if T ∗s,k = 0. This is not surprising,
as a set of parallel queues that start service at the same instant operate like a single server queue
with effective service capacity
∑K
k=1 µk.
3. Surprisingly though, Corollary 1 implies that staggering the start times of the queues can reduce
the PoA (even though it may increase the social cost), and induce arrival behavior closer to the
optimum.
4. As a special case, consider that all queues have the same service rate µ
K
and start at times spaced
τ apart. Then, the PoA expression reduces to
η=
2 +µτ(K − 1)
1 +µτ(K − 1)− µ2τ2
12
(K2− 1) . (8)
An easy lower bound on this expression follows from the fact that 1 + µτ(K − 1) > 1 + µτ(K −
1)− µ2τ2
12
(K2 − 1), which after simple algebra (and using some elementary facts) yields 2 > η >
1 + 1
1+µτ(K−1) > 4/3.
4. The Network Concert Game with Multiple Populations
We now consider multiple populations of users arriving at a K parallel queueing network. Let
N = {1, · · · ,N} be the set of arriving populations, each with risk characteristic (αi, βi). Denote
γi = αi/(αi + βi). Let the service start times be 0 = Ts,1 ≤ · · · ≤ Ts,K with mean service rates µk.
Recall, from Section 3, that the (fluid limit of the) expected cost of arrival for a population i user
to queue k at time t is given by Ci,k(t) = (αi + βi)Wi,k(t) + βit, which as earlier, is constant over
the arrival interval, and same across all the queues in the network.
α1, β1
αN, βN
μ1
μK
Figure 2 Arrivals from multiple populations into multiple queues.
The following Lemma shows an interesting self-organization property at equilibrium.
Lemma 3. Suppose that γ1 < γ2 · · · < γN . Then, at equilibrium population i users arrive before
population j users for i < j. Furthermore, the arrivals are over disjoint intervals, without any gaps.
Proof: Let Ts,k = 0, for all queues k. The general case will follow easily from the ensuing argument.
First note that there can be no gaps in any equilibrium arrival profile, Fk =
∑N
i=1Fi,k. If there
were, then, any arriving non-atomic user right after the gap can arbitrarily improve its cost by
arriving just before such a gap, implying this arrival profile is not in equilibrium. Now, the cost of
arriving at queue k is constant, for a given population i over the arrival interval. Differentiating
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f1,2(t)
0−T0,1 T1 τ1
−T0,2 T1 τ1 T2
T2
Ts,2
t
t
F1(t)
p2,1
p1,1
F2(t)
p2,2
p1,2
Q1(t)
Q2(t)
f2,1(t)
f2,2(t)
f1,1(t)
Figure 3 Two parallel queues, and two arriving populations with γ1 < γ2. Population 1 arrives over [−T0,1, T1]
at queue 1, and over [−T0,2, T1] at queue 2. However, population 1 need not be served completely until
time τ1 at either queue. Population 2 arrives over [T1, T2] and is completely served at time T2.
Ci,k(t), we have 0 = (αi + βi)(
1
µk
∂Fi,k(t)
∂t
)−αi. Solving the equation for fi,k, the arrival density, we
have fi,k(t) = µkγi.
Now, let (t1, t3) be an arbitrary interval, and suppose that t1 < t2 < t3, such that some
population j users arrive in (t1, t2] and only population i users arrive in (t2, t3). Consider the
cost of arrival for population j, Cj,k(t) = (αj + βj)
Fk(t)
µk
− αjt, for t ∈ (t1, t3). As (t1, t2] is in
the support of Fj,k, it follows that the cost of arrival is constant over this interval, and it can
be evaluated at t2. Now, let  > 0 be small enough so that t, t +  ∈ (t2, t3). Evaluating the
cost of arrival at these points and taking the difference of the resulting expressions we obtain
Cj,k(t + ) − Cj,k(t) = (αj + βj)
(∑N
l=1 Fl,k(t+)−
∑N
l=1 Fl,k(t)
µk
)
− αj. By assumption, there are only
arrivals from population i in the sub-interval (t2, t3), and it follows that Fl,k(t+ ) = Fl,k(t) for all
l 6= i. This implies that Cj,k(t+ )− Cj,k(t) = (αj + βj) (Fi,k(t+)−Fi,k(t))µk − αj. Divide through by
 and let → 0 to obtain C ′j,k(t) = (αj + βj) fi,k(t)µk − αj, where fi,k(t) is the density of the arrival
profile Fi,k(t), which was shown to be fi,k(t) = µkγi, for t∈ (t2, t3)⊂ SuppFi,k. Substituting for fi,k
it follows that C
′
j,k(t) = (αj +βj)(γi−γj). By assumption, γi <γj, so that C
′
j,k(t)< 0. This implies
that the cost of arrival for population j is strictly decreasing over the interval (t2, t3), and it must
be less than Cj,k(t2). Clearly, (t1, t2] cannot be in the support of Fj,k in equilibrium. This implies
that population j cannot arrive before population i, if i < j.
4.1. Arrival Distribution
Denote by −T0,k, the time of first arrival into queue k, and T0 :=−T0,1, the time of the very first
arrival to the network. Then, from Lemma 3, users from population i arrive in the interval [Ti−1, Ti].
Let τi denote the time the last user of population i is served, and τ0 = 0. Obviously, Ti ≤ τi, with
equality only if i = N since at equilibrium the last (non-atomic) user to arrive into the network
has no incentive to arrive before his service time. Figure 3 provides a simple illustration of this
phenomenon, for two arriving populations at two parallel nodes.
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Define Ji = {1 ≤ k ≤ K : Ts,k ∈ [τi−1, τi]}. Then, population i users are served by the queues
Ji =
⋃i
j=1 Jj, where queues Ji first serve population i before any other. Consider l ∈ Ji with aggre-
gate arrival profile Fl(t) =
∑N
n=iFn,l(t), where by Lemma 3, Fn,l has support [Tn−1, Tn]. Note that∑
l∈Ji pi,l =
∑i
j=1
∑
k∈Jj pi,k = 1. We can now derive the equilibrium arrival profile for each popu-
lation.
Theorem 6. Suppose γi < γi+1, ∀i and Ts,k < Ts,k+1, ∀k. Then, the unique equilibrium arrival
profile for population i at queue k ∈ Jj, j < i, is dF ∗i,k(t) = γiµk, ∀t ∈ [Ti−1, Ti], and at queue
l ∈ Ji is dF ∗i,l(t) = γiµl ∀t ∈ [−T0,l, Ti] where TN = 1∑N
i=1
∑
k∈Ji µk
(
N +
∑N
i=1
∑
k∈Ji µkTs,k
)
, and
Ti−1 = Ti− pi,kγiµk for i= 1, · · · ,N − 1, k ∈ Jj and j < i. For l ∈ Ji, the arrival interval is [−T0,l, Ti],
where −T0,l = Ti− pi,lγiµl .
Furthermore, equilibrium routing probability for l ∈ Ji, i≥ 1 is
pi,l =
µl∑i
j=1
∑
k∈Jj µk
(
i−
i∑
j=1
∑
k∈Jj
µk(Ts,l−Ts,k)
)
, (9)
and for k ∈ Jj, j < i, and i≥ 2 is
pi,k =
µk∑i
j=1
∑
k∈Jj µk
(
1−
∑
l∈Ji
µl
µk
(
i−1∑
q=j
pq,k)−
∑
l∈Ji
µl(Ts,k−Ts,l)
)
. (10)
Proof: Note that population i is served by queues Jl, l ≤ i. The expected cost for a population i
user to arrive at queue k ∈Ji is Ci,k(t) = (αi +βi)Wk(t) +βit for t∈ [Ti−1, Ti] for k ∈ Jl, l < i , and
for t ∈ [−T0,k, Ti] for k ∈ Ji. Recall that, Fk(t) =
∑N
j=iFj,k(t), where Fi,k(t) has support [−T0,k, Ti]
and Fjk(t) has support [Tj−1, Tj] for each j > i. The virtual waiting time process at queue k is given
by Wk(t) =
1
µk
Fk(t)− (t−Ts,k).
Now, note that at equilibrium, the expected cost for a population i user to arrive at any queues
k, l ∈ Ji has to be the same. Thus, from Ci,k(Ti) =Ci,l(Ti), we get that
pi,k
µk
+Ts,k =
pi,l
µl
+Ts,l. (11)
Let p≤ q < i be two populations that arrive prior to population i. Then, for any k ∈ Jp and m∈ Jq,
k <m and at equilibrium the expected cost of arriving into queues k and m for a population i user
has to be the same. Thus, from Ci,k(Ti) =Ci,m(Ti), we get
1
µk
(pp,k + pp+1,k + · · ·+ pi,k) +Ts,k = 1
µm
(pq,m + pq+1,m + · · ·+ pi,m) +Ts,m. (12)
First, consider p < q. Then, for a population q user, Cq,k(Tq) =Cq,m(Tq) for queues k,m as above,
which yields 1
µk
(pp,k + pp+1,k + · · ·+ pi,k) + Ts,k = 1µm (pq,m) + Ts,m. Substituting this into (12) we
have, by induction that
pi,m
µm
=
pi,k
µk
, ∀k ∈ Jp, m∈ Jq, p < q < i. (13)
Now consider p = q. Then, for any k, l ∈ Jp we have Ci,k(Ti) = Ci,l(Ti), implying 1µk (pp,k + · · ·+
pi,k) + Ts,k =
1
µl
(pp,l + · · ·+ pi,l) + Ts,l. It follows from (11) that pp,kµk + Ts,k =
pp,l
µl
+ Ts,l. Thus, by
induction, we have
pi,l
µl
=
pi,k
µk
, ∀k, l ∈ Jp, p < i. (14)
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Next, let population j < i, and k ∈ Jj and l ∈ Ji are two queues that serve population i. Once again
by the equilibrium conditions we have Ci,k(Ti) =Ci,l(Ti). Simplifying the expression we obtain
pi,k =
µk
µl
pi,l +µk(Ts,l−Ts,k)−
i−1∑
p=j
pp,k. (15)
Now, we have
∑i
p=1
∑
m∈Jp pi,m = 1. Consider a j < i and a k ∈ Jj for i ≥ 2. It follows that∑i
p=1,p6=j
∑
m∈Jp pi,m +
∑
l∈Jj ,l 6=k pi,l = 1− pi,k. Substituting for pi,m and pi,l in terms of pi,k from
(13), (14) and (15), we get pi,k in (10). Now, for an l ∈ Ji for any i≥ 1, using (11) and (15) and
substituting for pi,k and pi,m (respectively) in terms of pi,l in
∑i−1
j=1
∑
m∈Jj pi,m +
∑
k∈Ji,k 6=l pi,k =
1− pi,l, we get pi,l in (9).
We now derive the equilibrium arrival distributions for each population to each serving queue.
First, recall that the cost function for population i at queue k ∈ Jj, j < i, is given by Ci,k(t) =
(αi +βi)
(
1
µk
Fk(t) +Ts,k
)
−αit ∀t∈ [Ti−1, Ti]. Differentiating this and recalling that at equilibrium
the cost is constant over the arrival interval, and that Fk(t) =
∑i−1
p=j pp,k+Fi,k(t), we have dFi,k(t) =
γiµk ∀t ∈ [Ti−1, Ti]. Now, for queue k ∈ Ji, the users arrive over the interval [−T0,k, Ti]. Again,
differentiating the cost function Ci,k(t), we have dFi,k(t) = γiµk ∀t∈ [−T0,k, Ti].
Finally, we can derive the support of these distributions by backward recursion. Note that
for population N , ∀k ∈ JN µk(TN − Ts,k) = pN,k. Substituting for pN,k from (11), we get TN =(
N +
∑N
j=1
∑
k∈Jj µkTs,k
)
/
(∑N
j=1
∑
k∈Jj µk
)
.
Next, at equilibrium, we must have Ci,k(Ti) =Ci,k(Ti−1) ∀k ∈ Jj, j < i, from which we get Ti−1 =
Ti− pi,kγiµk . Note that we need to use j < i in order to obtain the recursive definition of Ti−1, since
Ci,k(t)<Ci,l(t) on [Ti−1,−T0,l], for l ∈ Ji; that is, there are no arrivals from population i at queue
l ∈ Ji on this sub-interval. Finally, population i users arrive at queue k ∈ Ji in the interval [−T0,l, Ti].
Thus, at equilibrium we must have Ci,k(−T0,k) =Ci,k(Ti), from which we obtain −T0,k = Ti− pi,kγiµk .
The proof of uniqueness now follows that of Theorem 4 and we omit it for brevity.
Remarks. 1. Theorem 6 shows that at equilibrium the arriving populations self-organize in ascend-
ing order of γi and there are no gaps in the arrival profile. Further, the queues operate at full
capacity till all arriving users have been served.
4.2. Price of Anarchy
We now compute the price of anarchy for the multiple populations case. Define the
social cost at equilibrium with arrival profile F , as J(F ) =
∑N
i=1 Ji(F ), where Jeq,i =∑i−1
j=1
∑
k∈Jj
∫ Ti
Ti−1
Ci,k(t)dFi,k(t) +
∑
l∈Ji
∫ Ti
−T0,l Ci,l(t)dFi,l(t).
At equilibrium, the cost of arrival for population i is uniform over the support of its
arrival profile, and moreover is the same at all queues that the population chooses to
arrive at. Thus, Ci,l(t) = ci, some constant. Then, if F is an equilibrium arrival pro-
file Jeq,i = ci
(∑i−1
j=1
∑
k∈Jj
∫ Ti
Ti−1
dFi,k(t) +
∑
l∈Ji
∫ Ti
−T0,l dFi,l(t)
)
= ci
∑l
j=1
∑
k∈Jj p0,k = ci, since∑i
j=1
∑
k∈Jj p0,k = 1. The aggregate equilibrium social cost is given by Jeq =
∑N
i=1 Jeq,i =
∑N
i=1 ci.
Let e1(i) denote the “first” queue in Ji, i.e., the queue with the earliest service start time Ts,l,
l ∈ Ji. At equilibrium we have Ci,e1(i)(Ti) = (αi + βi)(
pi,e1(i)
µe1(i)
+ Ts,e1(i))− αiTi ≡ ci, where, pi,e1(i)
is the fraction of population i users routed to queue e1(i). Now, let e1(1) be the very first queue
to start service (and serve population 1 first). Without loss of generality, let Ts,e1(1) = 0. For
population i the cost of arrival at any queue in Ji is the same over the arrival interval, and it
follows that Ci,e1(i)(Ti) = Ci,e1(1)(Ti), which implies that
pi,e1(i)
µe1(i)
+ Ts,e1(i) =
∑i
j=1
pj,e1(1)
µe1(1)
. Further,
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using the recursive definition of Ti, Ti = TN −
∑N
j=i+1
pj,e1(1)
γjµe1(1)
. Substituting for
pi,e1(i)
µe1(i)
+Ts,e1(i) and
Ti in Ci(Ti), we obtain
Jeq =
N∑
j=1
αj
(
1
γi
( i∑
j=1
µe1(i)
µe1(1)
pj,e1(1)
)
−µe1(i)Ts,e1(i)−
(
TN −
N∑
j=i+1
pj,e1(1)
γjµe1(1)
))
. (16)
Now, from Theorem 6 we have an expression for TN in terms of the exogeneous parameters of the
network. Substituting that into (16) we obtain an expression for Jeq that is, unfortunately, quite
messy for the general case. Below, we illustrate this expression for a much simpler special case.
Next, we note that the optimal arrival profile would be for each non-atomic user to arrive right
at the instant of service. In this case, there is no waiting time and the cost of arrival at time
t is βit, for a user of population i. Let pi : N → N be a permutation on the set of populations
such that βpi(1) > · · ·> βpi(N). In the optimal arrival profile populations should arrive in the order
pi(1), pi(2), · · · , pi(N).
A key observation is that since the sizeof each population is the same, the set of queues Ji that
serve population i at equilibrium, will now serve population pi(i). Let J ∗i be the set of queues that
serve population pi(i) in the optimal arrival profile. This is because there are no gaps in the optimal
and equilibrium arrival profiles. Thus, for given queue start time times, Ts,k, if population i in the
equilibrium arrival profile is replaced by population pi(i), the set of queues that served population
i will now serve population pi(i), whose users now arrive over [Ti−1, Ti], which is the equilibrium
arrival interval for population i.
Thus, the optimal social cost is
Jopt =
N∑
i=1
Jopt,pi(i) =
1
2
N∑
i=1
βpi(i)
( i−1∑
j=1
∑
k∈Jj
µk((T
∗
i )
2− (T ∗i−1)2) +
∑
l∈Ji
µl((T
∗
i )
2−T 2s,l)
)
, (17)
where Ti =
i+
∑i
j=1
∑
k∈Jj µkTs,k∑i
j=1
∑
k∈Jj µk
, and this is precisely the time at which population i finishes service
at equilibrium. We can substitute for Ti in (17), which yields a fairly complicated expression for
Jopt and the price of anarchy, η= Jeq/Jopt, in terms of the exogeneous parameters.
To get some insight into the price of anarchy, η, we illustrate it for a special case where the
service rate offered by every queue is the same µ> 0 and the start time of the kth queue is τ(k−1),
for some τ > 0. Let the number of queues that serve the first l populations to arrive be Kl. Then,
the instant at which population pi(l) (or population l, at equilibrium) is served out is given by
Tl =
l+
∑Kl
k=1
µτ(k−1)∑l
k=1 µ
=
l+µτ2 Kl(Kl−1)
µKl
. Note that Kl is unknown a priori, but can be easily calculated.
Suppose µτ < 1, and relax Kl ∈ [1,K] to take real values. Then, the following Lemma shows that
Tl is a convex function of Kl. The optimal value of Kl then is the nearest integer to the optimal
real value computed. Let [x] denote the nearest integer to the real number x.
Figure 4 plots Tl as a function of Kl, the number of queues that serve population l. Note that
Tl is a convex function of Kl and has a minima. We establish this fact formally in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. Suppose µτ < 1. Then, Tl is a convex function of Kl ∈ (1,K]. Further, it achieves a
minimum at K∗l = [
√
2l
µτ
].
Proof: From Theorem 6 we have Tl(k) =
l
µk
+ τ
2
(k− 1), for k ∈ (1,K]. Differentiating with respect
to k we obtain ∂Tl(k)
∂k
= − l
µk2
+ τ
2
, which yields a critical point k∗ =
√
2l/µτ (only the positive
value is feasible). Further, the second derivative yields ∂
2Tl(k)
∂k2
= 2l
µk3
> 0 ∀k ∈ (1,K]. Thus, Tl(k)
is convex for real k and achieves its minimum at K∗l = [k
∗].
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Figure 4 Terminal arrival time Tl as a function of Kl, the number of queues that service population l, plotted
for l= 1,7,14, and for µτ = 0.1 and µ= 1.0.
Remarks. 2. Lemma 4 shows that the number of queues that will serve population l, Kl, is
proportional to
√
l, when µτ < 1.
3. If (l−1)≤ µτ < l, then, there will be more than one queue that serves population l, and at most
one that serves all populations with index less than l. In this case as well, the number of queues
that serve population l can be found by solving a convex optimization problem.
Now, we characterize the price of anarchy in the special case when every queue in the network
serves at the same rate, and service start times are equi-spaces.
Theorem 7. Suppose that each queue offers the same service rate µ> 0, and queue k starts service
at time τ(k− 1) with τ > 0. Then, the price of anarchy η is
η=
τ
2
{(1− 1
γN
)
∑N
l=1αl +
∑N
l=1 βl}
µ
2
∑N
l=1 βl
{
τ2
12
√
2
µτ
(
√
l−√l− 1) + 2τ2
3
( 2
µτ
)3/2(l
√
l− (l− 1)√l− 1)− τ
µ
} ≤ 2.
Proof: The expression for η follows by substituting, for any queue l = 1, · · · ,K, µl = µ and Ts,l =
τ(l − 1) (i.e., the queue l starts service at time τ(l − 1)), in (16) and (17), using Lemma 4 and
taking Kl ≈
√
2l/µτ . The expression in the statement then follows after some elementary algebra
and is omitted for brevity.
To see that η is upper-bounded by 2, first consider N = 3. The expression for Jopt reduces to
Jopt = β1
τ
2
(
4
3
√
2
µτ
+
µτ
12
√
2
µτ
− 1
)
+
µ
2
β2
(
τ
√
2τ
µ
(√
2− 1
12
+
4
3µτ
(2
√
2− 1)
)
− τ
µ
)
+
µ
2
β3
(
τ
√
2τ
µ
(√
3−√2
12
+
4
3µτ
(3
√
3− 2
√
2)
)
− τ
µ
)
.
Jeq is simply
τ
2
(
1 − 1
γ3
)∑3
i=1αpi(i) +
τ
2
∑3
i=1 βpi(i) ≡ τ2
(
1 − 1
γ3
)∑3
i=1αi +
τ
2
∑3
i=1 βi. Using these
expressions, we evaluate 2Jopt−Jeq =
τ
2
3∑
i=1
(αi)
(
1
γ3
− 1
)
+ β1
τ
2
(
4
3
√
2
µτ
+
µτ
12
√
2
µτ
− 3
2
)
+β2
(
µτ
√
2τ
µ
(√
2− 1
12
+
4
3µτ
(2
√
2− 1)
)
− 3τ
2
)
+ β3
(
µτ
√
2τ
µ
(√
3−√2
12
+
4
3µτ
(3
√
3− 2
√
2)
)
− 3τ
2
)
.
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The first term on the right hand side is > 0, since γ3 < 1 and αi ≥ 0 for all i. The terms
after β2 and β3 can easily be verified to be non-negative. The only term left to consider is the
one after β1. Denote δ =
4
3
√
2
µτ
+ µτ
12
√
2
µτ
− 3
2
. Multiplying and dividing by
√
2/µτ we have
δ =
√
µτ
2
(
4
3
2
µτ
+ 1
6
− 3
2
√
2
µτ
)
. Let x :=
√
2/µτ . Then, it can be seen that δx = ( 4
3
x2 − 3
2
x + 1
6
).
Suppose that δx < 0. That is, (after factoring the LHS) (8x− 1)(x− 1) < 0. This implies either
(8x − 1) > 0 and (x − 1) < 0, which contradicts the fact that x = √2/µτ > 1 when µτ < 1;
or (8x − 1) < 0 and (x − 1) > 0 which is impossible. Therefore, it cannot be the case that
(8x − 1)(x − 1) < 0, thus proving that 2 ≥ Jeq/Jopt. It can also be checked (after some tedious
algebra) that the terms after βl, for l > 3, are larger than those after β3 and so it is possible to use
the same argument for an arbitrary number of arriving populations, N .
5. Exact equilibrium analysis: An example with two users
A natural question is whether equilibria can be found in a finite population strategic arrival game,
and how close the non-atomic equilibrium is to such an outcome. It turns out that finite population
equilibrium analysis is not malleable to a tractable analysis in general, and the resulting expressions
can be solved exactly only in some special cases. We illustrate the methodology with two FIFO
queues serving in parallel, with two arriving users, with service rates µk, service start times Ts,1 =
Ts,2 = 0. We derive the exact equilibrium arrival distribution, and show that it is unique. The
extension to more than two users cannot be solved in closed form. Finite population analysis for
a single server queue can be found in Juneja and Shimkin (2011), which also makes the same
observation.
Let the two users be indexed by i ∈ {1,2}, and let Ti be the arrival time of user i. Assume
that the distribution function Fi of Ti is absolutely continuous. Let ξi(t) = k ∈ {1,2} be a routing
random variable, such that ξi(ω, t) = k implies that user i at time t is routed to queue k. Let
pi,k(t) := P (ξi(t) = k) be the probability of user i being routed to queue k at time t. Let Q
i
k(t)
be the number of other arrivals that user i observes in queue k at time t, and let Aik(t) denote
the aggregate number of arrivals, other than the user i, to queue k queue by time t, and let Sk(t)
denote the cumulative number of (potential) service completions, at queue k, up to time t.
As noted before, the path-wise description of the queue length process is given by Qik(t) =
(Aik(t)−Sk(t))+, t∈R, i∈ {1,2} and k ∈ {1,2}. We also make the assumption that the routing,
arrival and service processes are mutually independent. We denote by −i, the user j 6= i. The
following proposition describes the dynamics of the expected queue length, Q¯ik(t).
Proposition 2. Q¯ik(t+ dt) = Q¯
i
k(t) + pk(t)f−i(t)dt− µk(1− Pk,0(t))dt1{t≥0} ∀i ∈ {1,2} and k ∈
{1,2}, where, f−i(·) is the density function of the arrival time of the user other than user i and
Pk,0(t) is the probability that the queue k is empty at time t, i.e., Pk,0(t) = P (Q
i
k(t) = 0).
Proof: It is easy to see that Q¯ik(t+dt) = Q¯
i
k(t)+E[Aik(t+dt)−Aik(t)]−E[Dk(t+dt)−Dk(t)]1{t≥0}.
Here, Dk(t) is the number of actual service completions by time t and E[Aik(t+ dt)−Aik(t)] is the
expected number of users other than i who might arrive in the interval [t, t+ dt]. The expectation
of user −i arriving in an infinitesimal time interval is pk(t)f−i(t)dt. The expected number of service
completions in the interval [t, t+ dt] is given simply by µk(1−P (Qik(t) = 0))dt. The expression for
Q¯ik(t) follows by substitution.
The mean virtual waiting time of user i at queue k at time t is given by W¯ ik(t) =
Q¯ik(t)
µk
− t1{t≤0}.
Note that an arrival at time t < 0, would have to wait for t units of time before service commences,
explaining the presence of the term t1{t≤0}.
Now, users choose a mixed strategy over the arrival interval and the routing random variable.
Thus, the strategy space of the game is Cb × [0,1]2, where Cb is the space of non-decreasing and
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absolutely continuous functions with support in R, and [0,1]2 is the set that the routing probabilities
take values in. Thus, user i chooses the tuple (Fi,pi)(t), ∀t ∈ R, where pi(t) = (p1,i(t), p2,i(t))′ is
a vector of probabilities at time t. Thus, the choice of pi(t) must satisfy the constraint p1,i(t) +
p2,i(t) = 1. We designate F= (F1,F2) as an arrival profile and P= (p1,p2) as a routing profile of
the game. We are interested in symmetric equilibria in this one-shot arrival game, such that F1 = F2
and p1 = p2. For brevity, we drop the superscripts from Q
i
k and A
i
k, as the definition should be
clear from the context.
Now, as before, the expected cost of arriving at queue k is a weighted sum of the waiting time
and the time at which the user arrives, which yields Ck(t) = (α+ β)
(
Q¯k(t)
µk
− t1{t≤0}
)
+ βt. Note
that the equilibrium arrival profile will have some finite support [−T0,k, Tk] for queue k since the
expected cost is increasing in both t and −t (since there is only one other user, the expected queue
length is bounded by 1). Furthermore, the expected cost of arrival must be the same at either
queue. If this were not the case, then an arriving user could improve its cost by choosing to arrive
at a queue with a lower cost. We are interested in symmetric equilibria for which the arrival interval
must be the same at either queue. Let this interval be [−T0, T ], where −T0 and T are determined
in equilibrium.
Theorem 8. The equilibrium profile, (F∗,P∗), of the strategic arrivals game with two users and
two queues is given by
f∗(t) =
{
γ(µ1 +µ2) t∈ [−T0,0]
γ(µ1 +µ2)−µ1P1,0(t)−µ2P2,0(t) t∈ (0, T ],
and p∗i (t) =
{
µi
(µ1+µ2)
, t∈ [−T0,0]
µi
(µ1+µ2)
+ (1{i=1}−1{i=2})µ1µ2(µ2−µ1)(µ1+µ2)f(t)
βt
(α+β)
, t∈ (0, T ],
where γ = α/(α+β), Pi,0(t) = 1− µi(βt−αT0)α+β and
T0 =−
(
µ1 +µ2
(µ21 +µ
2
2)
)√(
2 +
β
α
)
β
α
and T =
(
µ1 +µ2
µ21 +µ
2
2
)(√
2α
β
+ 1− 1
)
.
The proof can be found in the appendix.
Remarks. 1. Note that the general case of K parallel queues serving n users is not as simple as
the result above. The network state dynamics are determined by a set of K coupled differential
equations, that are in general quite difficult to solve. Instead, using a fluid approximation reduces
the complexity of the problem, by allowing one to replace the differential equations by simple linear
equations.
2. The fluid analysis does lose some accuracy, however, for small numbers of arrivals since it
suggests that queues can never be idle at equilibrium, but for a large number of users it still
captures the essential features of the strategic arrivals game.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented three results. First, we have developed large population fluid
approximations to various processes of interest in a parallel queueing network where the arriving
users choose a time of arrival from an arbitrary distribution function. We believe these are entirely
new results and should be of independent interest. Second, using this framework, we then studied
the network concert queueing game in the large population regime. We proved the existence and
uniqueness of the non-atomic equilibrium arrival profile, both in the case of a homogeneous popu-
lation of users, as well as heterogeneous populations with disparate cost characteristics. In either
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case, we also characterized the price of anarchy of the game, due to strategic arrivals. Third, we
demonstrated the methodology for finite population analysis, by analyzing a simple instance with
two strategic users arriving at a two queue network, and deriving the equilibrium arrival profile.
The queueing model that we have introduced in this paper is of relevance in several settings
including transportation networks, data center network traffic, etc. Thus, it would be useful to
understand further the various stochastic processes. For example, the FSLLN/fluid limit analysis
shows that at equilibrium, no queue is ever idle. This, however, cannot be true in the case of a
finite population, where, as we have seen in Section 5, there is a positive probability of the queue
being idle during the arrival interval. Thus, we must derive better approximations to the arrival,
queue-length and waiting-time processes. One way would be to derive diffusion limits by developing
functional central limit theorems (FCLT) for the queueing system model we introduced. This is a
current line of our research. In particular, we have been able to establish that the diffusion limiting
process to the queue-length in a single server queue is combination of a Brownian motion and a
Brownian bridge, where the weak convergence has been established in Skorokhod’s M1 topology.
Finally, the alternative queueing system model we have introduced in this paper may involve
a general queueing network. In such a setting, it would be useful to develop the fluid and diffu-
sion limits for the various processes of interest, and to establish the set of (non-atomic) strategic
equilibria that result. We are currently working towards this goal. Our hope is that the framework
that we have introduced would be of greater relevance for some scenarios, as well as more tractable
than the GI/G/1 models in standard queueing theory.
Appendix
We first state two Lemmas that are useful in proving Theorem 1, and are also useful below.
Lemma 5. Let Ank(t), ∀k, be as defined in (1), where n is the population size, and p =
(p0,1, · · · , p0,K)′. Then, A¯n(t) := A
n(t)
n
→ F (t) a.s. u.o.c. ∀t∈ [−T0, T ], as n→∞.
Lemma 6. Let
(
1
n
Snk (t), V
n
k (t+ T0)
)
be as defined in (2) and (3), where k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} and t ∈
[−T0,∞). Then, as n→∞,(
1
n
Sn(t),Vn(t+T0)
)
→ (S¯(t), V¯(t)) := (M−1ts,+(t),M1(t+T0)) a.s. u.o.c. ∀ t∈ [−T0,∞),
where M := diag(m1, · · · ,mK) is a diagonal matrix of the mean service times at each node,
ts,+(t) := ((t−Ts,1))1{t≥Ts,1}, · · · , (t−Ts,K)1{t≥Ts,K})
′
and 1= (1, · · · ,1)′.
Both Lemmas above can be proved easily using the Strong Law of Large Numbers, and their
proofs are omitted due to space constraints.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: (Proposition 1) In order to establish a functional strong law of large numbers result for (4)
we first require the following lemma relating the processes Ink(t) :=
(∫ t
Ts,k
1{Qn
k
(s)=0}ds
)
1{t≥Ts,k}
and I˜n(t) :=
∫ t
−T0 1{Q
n
k
(s)=0}ds.
Lemma 7. Let Ink (t) and I˜
n
k (t), the kth components of I
n(t) and I˜n(t), be elements of D. Then,
as n→∞, |Ink (t)− I˜nk (t)| → 0 a.s. u.o.c. ∀t∈ [−T0,∞). Thus, |In(t)− I˜n(t)| → 0, a.s. u.o.c. ∀t∈
[−T0,∞).
The proof of Lemma 7 follows directly from the following result.
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Lemma 8. Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space. F (t) is a distribution function of a random variable
T on this space, with support [S,T ] ⊂ R. Assume that F (t) is absolutely continuous. Suppose
T1, T2, · · · , Tn are n I.I.D. samples drawn from T . Define T (n)1 := inf{T1, T2, · · · Tn} as the value of
the smallest sample. Then, it follows that, T
(n)
1 ↓ S a.s. as n→∞.
Proof: We will prove this in the case of a uniformly distributed random variable, on [0,1]. Let U(t)
be the distribution function of the standard uniform random variable, and let F (t) = U(t). The
general case then follows by making use of a transformation of the uniform random variable, since
F (t) is assumed to be absolutely continuous. Fix  > 0. Consider the event, En := {ω : T (n)1 ≥ }.
The measure of this event is given by, P (En) = P (T
(n)
1 ≥ ) = P (inf{T1, · · · , Tn} ≥ ). Since the
samples are I.I.D., it follows easily that, P (En) = [P (T1 ≥ )]n = [1−F ()]n. Since F (t) is absolutely
continuous, it follows that,
∑∞
n=1P (En) < ∞. By the First Borel- Cantelli Lemma, it follows that
P (T
(n)
1 ≥  i.o.) = 0. This implies that T (n)1 ↓ S = 0 a.s..
Proof: (Lemma 7) Let τ > 0. As the queue is non empty after the very first arrival to the node,
we have Ink (t) ≡ (
∫ t
T
(n)
k,1
1{Qn
k
(s)=0}ds)1{t≥Ts,k}. It is easy to see that I
n
k (t) ≤ I˜nk (t) ∀t ∈ [−T0, τ ].
Also, Ink (t)≥ I˜nk (t)−
∫ T (n)
k,1
−T0 1{Qnk (s)=0}ds, ∀t∈ [−T0, τ ]. It follows that
∫ T (n)
k,1
−T0 1{Qnk (s)=0}ds ≥ I˜nk (t)−
Ink (t) ≥ 0.
The conclusion follows on [−T0, τ ], by noting that Qnk(s) = 0 ∀s ∈ [−T0, T (n)k,1 ] and applying
Lemma 8. Since τ is arbitrary, the lemma is proved.
Now, we can proceed to prove Lemma 1, and we analyze the claim component-wise, since
the processes at each node are statistically independent. The result follows by applying
Lemmas 5, 6 and 7 to (4). First, note that Bnk (t) ≤ t. Thus, by the Random Time Change
Theorem (Theorem 5.5, Chen and Yao (2001)) and Lemma 6 it follows that 1
n
Snk (B
n
k (t)) −
µkB
n
k (t)→ 0, a.s. u.o.c. as n→∞ ∀t ∈ [−T0,∞). By Lemma 5 we have 1nAnk(t)− p0,kF (t)→ 0,
a.s. u.o.c. as n → ∞ ∀t ∈ [−T0,∞). Applying these results and Lemma 7 to (4) we have
Xnk (t) → X¯k(t) := (p0,kF (t) − µk(t − Ts,k)1{t≥Ts,k}) a.s. u.o.c. as n → ∞. It follows that
Xn(t)→ (pF (t)−M−1ts,+(t)), a.s. u.o.c., as n→∞, ∀t∈ [−T0,∞).
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: Recall that 1
n
Qn(t) :=Xn(t) +Yn(t), where Xn and Yn are defined in (4) and (5), respec-
tively. Note that if we defined Yn(t) := In(t) = ts,+(t)−Bn(t), the Oblique Reflection Mapping
Theorem (Theorem 7.2, Chen and Yao (2001)) would not be satisfied, since this process could be
zero even when Qn(t) is zero. To see this, note that if T
(n)
1 is the time of the first arrival to the
network then, ∀t ∈ [−T0, T (n)1 ], In(t) and Qn(t) would be zero, violating the Oblique Reflection
Mapping Theorem.
It is a simple exercise to verify that Theorem 7.2 of Chen and Yao (2001) is satisfied, in the case
of a parallel node network, with Yn(t) = M−1I˜n(t): The zero matrix P is trivially a M -matrix.
By definition, we have Qn(t)≥ 0, ∀t∈ [−T0,∞). Yn(t) is a non-decreasing K-dimensional process
that only grows when every component of Qn(t) is zero.
This implies, ( 1
n
Qn(t),Yn(t)) = (Φ(Xn(t)),Ψ(Xn(t))). The reflection regulator map, Ψ(·),
is Lipschitz continuous under the uniform metric (Theorem 7.2, Chen and Yao (2001)). By
the Continuous Mapping Theorem and Lemma 1 it follows that (Φ(Xn(t)),Ψ(Xn(t))) →
(Φ(X¯(t)),Ψ(X¯(t))), a.s. u.o.c. as n→∞, ∀t∈ [−T0,∞).
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: We prove the Theorem by treating the busy time and virtual waiting time processes sepa-
rately. The fluid limit of the busy time process is derived in the following Lemma.
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Lemma 9. Let Bn := (Bn1 , · · · ,BnK)
′
be an element of DK. Then as n → ∞ Bn(t) → B¯(t) :=
ts,+(t) −MΨ(X¯(t)) = ts,+(t) −M sup−T0≤s≤t[−X¯(s)]+ u.o.c. a.s., ∀t ∈ [−T0,∞), where, ts,+(t) =
(t1{t≥Ts,1}, · · · , t1{t≥Ts,K})
′
and M = diag(m1, · · · ,mK).
Proof: By definition, we have, Bn(t) = ts,+(t) − In(t). Adding and subtracting the vector pro-
cess I˜n(t) and noting that Yn(t) = M−1I˜n(t) we have Bn(t) = ts,+(t)−MYn(t) + I˜n(t)− In(t).
Using Lemma 7 from the Appendix and Theorem 2 it follows that as n→∞, Bn(t)→ ts,+(t)−
MΨ(X¯(t)) a.s. u.o.c., ∀t∈ [−T0,∞).
Next, we derive the fluid limit of the virtual waiting time process in the following Lemma.
Lemma 10. Let Wn = (W n1 , · · · ,W nK)
′ ∈DK. Then as n→∞Wn(t)→ W¯(t) :=MpF (t)− B¯(t)−
ts,−(t) a.s. u.o.c., ∀t ∈ [−T0,∞), where ts,−(t) = ((t − Ts,1)1{t≤Ts,1,}, · · · , (t − Ts,K)1{t≤Ts,K})
′
,
p= (p0,1, · · · , p0,K)′ and M= diag(m1, · · · ,mK).
Proof: The theorem follows by an application of Lemma 1, the Random Time Change The-
orem (Theorem 5.5, Chen and Yao (2001)) and Lemma 3. We define the following vector for
notational convenience. Let V(A(t)) := (V1(A1(t)), · · · , VK(AK(t)))′ The fluid-scaled version
of the virtual waiting time process is given by Wn(t) = Vn(An(t)) − Bn(t) − ts,−(t). First
note that by Lemma 6 and the Random Time Change Theorem Vn(An(t)) − M 1
n
An(t) →
0 u.o.c. a.s. as n→∞, ∀t ∈ [−T0,∞). Thus, centering the process Vn(An(t)) we get Wn(t) =
Vn(An(t)) −M 1
n
An(t) + M 1
n
An(t) − Bn(t) − ts,−(t). Applying Lemma 5, Lemma 3 and the
comment above we have Wn(t) → MpF (t) − B¯(t) − ts,−(t). Substituting for B¯(t) we get
W¯(t) =MpF (t)− (ts,+(t)−MΨ(X¯(t)))− ts,−(t) =MQ¯(t)− ts,−(t).
Proof of Theorem 8
Proof: Recall that Ci(t) = c, a constant, ∀i ∈ {1,2}. Noting that that expected queue length at
time −T0 is zero, it is easy to see that c= αT0. It follows that C ′i(t) = 0. Thus, solving for pi(t)f(t)
we obtain
pi(t)f(t) =
{
γµi t∈ [−T0,0]
γµi−µiPi,0(t) t∈ (0, T ].
Using the fact that p1(t) + p2(t) = 1, we solve for p1(t) and p2(t) to obtain
pi(t) =
{
µi
(µ1+µ2)
t∈ [−T0,0]
µi
(µ1+µ+2)
+ (1{i≡1}−1{i≡2})µ1µ2(µ2−µ1)(µ1+µ2)f(t)
βt
(α+β)
t∈ (0, T ].
Thus, it can be seen that the probability of being routed to queue i (in equilibrium) is constant
before service commences, and is time dependent afterwards. The time dependence is determined
by the expected idle time of the queue, as can be seen by solving for f(t). Again, using the fact
that p1(t) + p2(t) = 1, add the equations for pi(t)f(t), for i∈ {1,2}, to obtain
f(t) =
{
γ(µ1 +µ2) t∈ [−T0,0]
γ(µ1 +µ2)−µ1P1,0(t)−µ2P2,0(t) t∈ (0, T ].
Interestingly, the arrival distribution is piecewise continuous. It is uniform up to time 0, at which
point service commences, and is a continuous function of t in [0, T ]. Notice that when there are only
two arriving users, the expected queue length observed by one of the arrivals is fully determined by
the probability of idling. We have for queue i, Q¯i(t) = 1×P (Qi(t) = 1) + 0×P (Qi(t) = 0) = Pi,1(t).
Now, using the fact that Pi,0(t) +Pi,1(t) = 1 and the fact that Ci(t) = αT0, we can solve for Pi,1(t)
18
to obtain Pi,1(t) =
µi(βt−αT0)
(α+β)
= 1−Pi,0(t). Thus, we can now substitute for f(t) on (0, T ] to obtain
f(t) = (γ− 1)(µ1 +µ2) + αT0−βt(α+β) (µ21 +µ22).
By definition, we have
∫ T
−T0 f(t)dt= 1. Note that f(t) is a continuous function of t in the interval
[0, T ]. By assumption, F has no point masses. Thus, it follows that f(T ) = 0. Now, using the fact
that
∫ T
−T0 f(t)dt= 1 we have (γ− 1)(µ1 +µ2)(T +T0)− (µ21 +µ22)((1− γ)
T2−T20
2
− γT0(T +T0)) = 1.
Next, using the fact that f(T ) = 0, we have T = µ1+µ2
µ21+µ
2
2
− α
β
T0. Substituting for T in terms of T0
from the expression above, and solving the resulting quadratic equation, we obtain
T0 =−
(
µ1 +µ2
(µ21 +µ
2
2)
)√(
2 +
β
α
)
β
α
and T =
(
µ1 +µ2
µ21 +µ
2
2
)(√
2α
β
+ 1− 1
)
.
These expressions describe the symmetric equilibrium strategy (F ∗,p∗) in the case of two
strategically arriving users and two parallel queues. The uniqueness of the equilibrium profile
follows by construction. For given service rates and cost characteristics, it is clear that T and T0
are unique. It is easy to see that T and −T0 together fully determine F ∗ and hence p∗. It follows
that the arrival profile and routing profiles are unique.
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